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Charles W. Wolfram* Lights, Camera, Litigate:
Lawyers and the Media in
Canada and the United States1
Drawing on recent high profile cases in Canada and the United States, the author
examines the different extent to which lawyers in those two countries comment
to the media about ongoing litigation. He investigates various formal constraints
upon lawyer comment, such as court-imposed publication bans and rules of
professional responsibility. He also looks at the way in which lawyer behaviour is
attributable to non-formal, cultural determinants.
A la lumiere de certaines causes r6centes largement couvertes par les m6dias
au Canada et aux Etats-Unis, I'auteur examine dans quelle mesure les avocats
Canadien, par rapport aux avocats Am6ricain, offrent des commentaires aux
m6dias portant sur un litige en cours. L'auteur examine certaines contraintes
formelles qui limitent ce genre de commentaire telles que les r~gles de
responsabilit6 professionelle et I'interdiction de publication imposee par la Cour.
II analyse aussi dans quelle mesure la predisposition d'un avocat a faire certains
commentaires aux medias est attribuable j des facteurs culturels plut6t que
formels.
Introduction
There are various ways, I am sure, of describing the comparative law
exercise that I want to pursue with you-you who are students, you who
are scholars, and you who are practitioners of Canadian law in a Canadian
legal culture. I want to compare and reflect upon the rather dramatic
differences in the ways that Canadian and American lawyers approach
the issue of lawyer media comment-the extent to which a lawyer may
permissibly talk to the media when it is apparent that the media will
publicize the lawyer's words. In brief, in Canada this is not regularly
done, although its frequency may be increasing. By contrast, lawyers in
America seem to pass by such opportunity only rarely.2 As the current
* Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, New York.
1. This is a revised version of the 1996 F.B. Wickwire Memorial Lecture, delivered at
Dalhousie Law School on 14 November 1996.
2. No reliable empirical study exists of how widespread is the practice of lawyer comment to
the media. Impressionistic accounts vary. Compare Greenhouse, "Justices to Rule on Outside
Comments by Lawyers" N.Y. Times (8 Jan. 1991) A17, col. 3, at col. 4 (common for both
defence lawyers and prosecutors to make public proclamations of defendant's guilt or
innocence); "Be Open with Media but Think Before You Speak, Lawyers Told" Lawyers
Weekly (21 June 1991), (various lawyer impressions that professional prohibition against
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American lawyer witticism has it: "let's try this lawsuit in the old-
fashioned way: in the newspapers."3 Why this profound difference
between our legal cultures?
In large part, as we will see, that difference could have been explained
in years past as flowing from profound differences in legal doctrine. But,
at least at some levels, those lines of doctrinal difference are now
converging. That has occurred chiefly due to enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 almost fifteen years ago. Nonetheless,
what continues to separate our law-practice systems, in my view, is our
different legal and general cultures. In the end, I will conclude that those
cultural differences will probably ensure that our different professional
practices on media comment will endure.
We in the United States approach a Canadian-U.S. difference in law,
often, with suspiciousness bordering on xenophobia. One can almost read
the American mind muttering, "If the Canadian rule had any appeal,
surely we would have adopted it as our own. It's different, and that makes
it presumptively wrong." Some in the United States would describe that
attitude as "in your face" confrontational. The Canadian approach to
transborder differences is quite different. This was recently captured in
a comment attributed by the United States press to Linda Torney, an
organizer of the protest in Toronto in late October 1996 against cuts in the
province's welfare safety net. According to the New York Times,
Ms. Torney told a reporter that cuts in such mainstays of Canadian life as
the CBC were wrong: "These are the marks of a caring society and-no
expressing to media personal opinion on merits of client's case frequently flouted). Beyond
frequency, there are no clear statistical indications that adverse media, much less lawyer media
comment independently, is a significant factor leading to unfair court outcomes. See L. Snyder,
"Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by Attorneys" (1995) 28
Creighton L. Rev. 357 at 390ff. But see P. Reardon, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1966) at vii (assertion, without statistical support,
that increasing numbers of defendants being prejudiced by excessive trial publicity); Special
Comm. on Radio & Television of the Association of the B. of the City of N.Y., Radio,
Television and the Administration of Justice (1965) (same).
3. The traditional stance, of course, is the reverse: "A lawyer should try his cases in court and
not in the newspapers or through other news media ... " Am. Coll. Tr. Lawyers, Code of Trial
Conduct, rule 23 (1987 rev.). The American College of Trial Lawyers is composed primarily
of corporate defence litigators, who typically work with corporations that have both in-house
and outside public relations staff, to whom, of course, the anti-comment rules do not apply.
Their "Code of Trial Conduct" is merely hortatory and is very rarely mentioned in lawyer
discipline decisions. Its rule on trial comment, if adopted officially, would clearly be
unconstitutional. Its sentiment, nonetheless, is probably widely shared among judges. E.g.
Lawrence v. Evans, 573 So.2d 695,696 (Miss. 1990) (describing "the all-too-familiar but still
most lamentable practice of trying [lawyer'sl lawsuit in the press").
4. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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offence-what sets us apart from the United States. '5 "No offence,"
Ms. Tomey? No pie-in-the-face arrogance about which culture is supe-
rior? How unusual it would be for a citizen in the United States to reply
apologetically to a Canadian reporter when noting a difference between
the two nations in a way suggesting the superiority of the approach taken
in the United States. After reading Ms. Tomey's words, I felt like
replying, "I personally take no offence, Ms. Torney. But, with respect, I
disagree. I think there is much more that sets us apart, andpolitesse is only
one of those differences, if an important one that I hope you continue to
treasure." For whatever the reasons may be for difference in history,
geography, education, courts or other public institutions, climate, na-
tional origins, demographics-for whatever reason, the dominant legal
cultures in Canada and the United States are growing increasingly
different. I see that as neither necessarily good or bad-but merely as
neutral-and as something that reflects the maturing of our respective
senses of nationhood and separate place. One loses sight of that widening
gulf in legal matters only at peril of profound misunderstanding.
I. Advocates and the Media in Canada-
Restraint in Speech and Press
I begin with the Canadian scene, with unspeakably horrible crimes and a
notorious defendant-the sex murders of two young women for which a
jury has now convicted Paul Bernardo.6 As I need remind only those few,
either Canadian or American, who missed the extensive media coverage
of the crime, Bernardo was a bookkeeper with a well-hidden past of
extensive criminal sexual assaults. Equally incomprehensible as a human
being was his wife, Karla Homolka, who was apparently ready to
accommodate Bernardo's horrific sexual need to rape and then murder
young women, all the while videotaping their ordeal. Among other
gruesome facts, which would have been routinely and immediately
5. N.Y. Times (26 Oct. 1996) 3, col. 1. The Times editors were so taken with Ms. Torney's
simple and unusual politeness that it was displayed, alone among all the quotes of the day, as
the highlight in the Times' "News Summary". See ibid. at 2, col. 6.
6. I gather much of the background facts, aside from bare-bones references in judicial
opinions, from American news reports. See Davison, "Canada: Canadian Media Restrained
After Gag Order Lifted," Reuters News Service (20 May 1995) (Nexis); Turner, "Courts Gag
Media at Sensational Canada Trial," LA. Times (15 May 1994) A4, col. 1. On the efforts that
Canadian border authorities and broadcast officials were required to make in order to enforce
the publication ban against imported American news sources, see Turner (blacking out of
segments of American television news broadcasts and seizure of American newspapers at the
border). Nonetheless, reportedly some news reached Canadians through computer bulletin
boards and via fax. See Edmonds, "Canada: Grisly Murder Trial to Make Quiet Town Media
Circus" Reuters News Serv. (3 May 1994) (Ne'is).
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reported in the American media, was that Homolka had earlier, before
their marriage, participated in his sexual attack on her own fifteen-year-
old sister, which resulted in the sister's death as well. In the United States,
Bernardo's trial would have been flooded with media. None of the
inhuman and gruesome details would have been spared in their reporting.
Even the most gory would undoubtedly have found a wide outlet, at least
in the American tabloid press.
What unfolded in Canada, however, was entirely different. Before
Bernardo's trial, Homolka confessed in court to her participation in the
crimes that had also been charged against him. But before she confessed,
the judge excluded the general public from the courtroom. He permitted
Canadian journalists to remain, but prohibited them from reporting what
they heard until a later point. As he had no control over what American
reporters would publish, he ordered them to leave along with the public.
Homolka then gave her confession. No Canadian news outlet violated the
court's publication ban.
Customarily, the publication ban would have ended once the proceed-
ings against Homolka ended. But here there was a complication-
Bernardo himself was yet to be tried and Homolka was to testify against
him. The court continued the ban against reporting her confession until
the conclusion of Bernardo's trial.7 The logic of continuing the ban was
fairly obvious-to protect Bernardo from public revulsion against him
because of Homolka's disclosure of their crimes during her own trial. But
the interesting development, for our purposes, is that Bernardo's lawyers
did not want the ban continued permanently and as to all pretrial matters,
evidently believing it preferable that the public know the defence re-
sponse to certain matters that were already being publicized, particularly
by the families of the young victims. In addition, of course, Homolka
had-if I may revert to Americanese-"cut a deal" with prosecutors and
obtained a comparatively light sentence in return for her cooperation in
testifying against him. At least those members of the Canadian public
interested in strict enforcement of the criminal laws might be quite
concerned to know of such uses of the law of sentencing.8 Because the ban
was continued, the Canadian media could not provide sufficient detail to
the Canadian public to portray that point.
7. SeeR. v. Bernardo (1995), 38 C.R. (4th) 229 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
8. See e.g. Blatchford, "A Matter of New Justice" Toronto Sun (18 May 1995) 5 (account,
necessarily incomplete because of pending publication ban, of efforts of Gordon Domm to
overturn Bernardo ban because of objection to light sentence given Homolka); Turner, "Courts
Gag Media at Sensational Canada Trial," LA. Times (15 May 1994) A4, col. 1 (same).
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Not all Canadians, of course, agree with publication bans against
reporting trials.9 In America, a publication ban in the equivalent circum-
stances would be unthinkable, and, were a judge so rash as to enter one,
the ban would certainly be vacated by an appellate court as an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint.'I
But in Canada, publication bans can be perfectly lawful and, in
appropriate circumstances, consistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. The key decision, of course, is Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation." Four men who were members of
a Roman Catholic religious order were charged with physical and sexual
abuse of young boys who had been placed in their care in a Catholic
training school. Their trials were to be held before ajury. At that point the
CBC began advertising a nation-wide broadcast of a four-installment
miniseries entitled, "The Boys of St. Vincent," a fictional account of
sexual and physical abuse of children by clerics in a Catholic institution.
On application of defence counsel for the defendants, the trial court in
Ontario granted an interlocutory injunction, prohibiting broadcast of
"The Boys of St. Vincent" until completion of the trials. The Ontario
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the media, after modifying the
order to apply only in Ontario and to one television station in Montreal-
the actual sites of the four trials."
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Chief Justice Lamer for the majority
first noted that the common law rule recognizing discretion in the trial
courts to impose publication bans was a common law power that predated
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But, said the Chief
Justice, the common law rule, since it favored the right of fair trial over
the right of free expression, was inconsistent with the equal status that the
Charter provided both to freedom of expression (guaranteed by s. 2(b) 3)
9. For media criticism of the Bernardo publication ban, see e.g. Fotheringham, "Canada:
Cameras Belong in Bernardo Courtroom-Canadians Are Pusillanimous About Their Rights"
Financial Post (9 Feb. 1995) (Lexis). Turner, supra note 4, quotes Professor Michael Mandel
of Osgoode Hall Law School as criticizing bans because they "take jurors for such morons that
they can't tell the difference between evidence heard at trial and what appears in the
newspaper." He then quotes Catherine Ford, associate editor of the Calgary Herald, as
defending bans in some cases: "There's a hierarchy of rights, and the right of the accused to
a fair trial has to come first over the public's right to know every detail of what happened
whenever they want to hear it ......
10. See infra text at note 92.
11. [19941 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (1994) [hereinafter Dagenais cited to S.C.R.].
12. (1994), 12 O.R. (3d) 239, 99 D.L.R. (4th) 326.
13. Section 2(b) states that "[e]veryone has the following fundament freedoms:... (b) freedom
of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication .... "
378 The Dalhousie Law Journal
and to the right of an accused to a fair trial (guaranteed by s. 1 1(d)14).1 5 In
the United States, constitutional jurisprudence would have required a
court either to accommodate in some way the basic meaning of both
provisions-if possible, within the relatively narrow limitations of judi-
cial doctrine, developed without textual support in the American Consti-
tution-and, if not, to give predominance to one right or the other. 6
Because common law rules are by and large the province only of state
courts, the United States Supreme Court would be required in such a case
either to accept as constitutional the common law rule as announced by
the state court being reviewed or to strike it down as unconstitutional
under supreme federal law.
Canada's Charter and its other constitutional arrangements provide
yet a third option, which the court exercised in Dagenais. 7 The Supreme
Court of Canada self-consciously modified the common law rule, as it has
the power to do, in light of the two contending Charter rights and in view
of the unique and express feature of the Charter-its s. 1. That provision
in effect invites the Canadian courts to engage in deliberate balancing. 8
14. Section 1 l(d) provides that: "Any person charged with an offence has the right... (d) to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal ..
15. Dagenias, supra note 11 at 877.
16. The Chief Justice referred to this feature of American constitutional law as the "clash
model" of constitutional adjudication. See ibid. at 882. By contrast, in Canadian jurisprudence,
"[a] hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided, both
when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law ... " Ibid. at 877.
17. See generally P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada §§ 40.2-40.13 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992); W. Lederman, Assessing Competing Values in the Definition of Charter
Rights and Freedoms, in G. Beaudoin & E. Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 127-63. On free-expression issues not
involving publication bans, see A. Polak, "Free Legal Trade: American First Amendment
Theory Fails to Persuade Canadian Courts" (1994) 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 579.
18. See Dagenais, supra note 11 at 877 ("When the protected rights of two individuals come
into conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans, Charter principles require a balance
to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both sets of rights.") See generally F. Liss,
"A Mandate to Balance: Judicial Protection of Individual Rights Under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1992) 41 Emory L.J. 1281.
The balancing approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagenais had been generally
anticipated in opinions of, for example, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Re Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. (1994), 148 N.B.R. (2d) 161, 116 D.L.R. (4th) 506 (exclusion of media
from sex-crime sentencing, necessary to protect victim, infringed guarantee of freedom of
media under s. 2(b), but was justified under s. 1 of Charter) and the Ontario Court of Appeal
in R. v. Squires (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 385, 59 O.A.C. 281 (statutory prohibition against taking
film of person leaving courtroom infringed media freedom under s. 2(b) of Charter, but was
reasonable limit prescribed by law under s. 1). See also Y.M. v. Children's Aid Society (1989),
94 N.S.R. (2d) 143, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 427 at 432-33 (Co. Ct.) (in view of tension between right
of open access to courts and statutory objective of protecting children involved in child-welfare
proceeding, s. 1 analysis pursued in resolving to admit reporter but ban publication of details
identifying child or family involved).
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According to s. 1, "[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society." From that perspective, the court inDagenais
concluded that the common law rule must be adapted so as to require a
consideration of both the objectives of a publication ban, and the
proportionality of the ban to its effects on protected Charter rights. The
modified rule may be stated as follows:
A public ban should be ordered only when:
(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk 9
to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative
measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.2'
Applying its own test, the court concluded that, while "the publication
ban... was clearly directed towards preventing a real and substantial risk
to the fairness of the trial of the four accused,"'21 reasonable alternative
measures were available, and thus the court was not required to engage
in the explicit balancing required by the second prong of its test. Those
alternative measures included "adjourning trials, changing venues, se-
questering jurors, allowing challenges for cause of voir dires during jury
selection, and providing strong judicial direction to the jury .... ,,22 The
court concluded with some thoughts about the limited efficacy of some
publication bans, given the general reliability of juries 23 and given
technological advances that have made publication bans porous. 24 In the
process, the court rephrased the "proportionality" branch of the Oakes
test, which had formerly been based solely on the balance between the
19. As the Dagenais court went on to say, the objective of preventing "real and substantial
risk" of unfairness in the trial is limited: "publication bans are not available as protection
against remote and speculative dangers." Supra note 11 at 880.
20. Ibid. at 878 (emphasis in original). The Dagenais court noted that its test reflects the
substance of the so-called Oakes test developed to test the constitutionality of legislation under
s. 1 of the Charter. SeeR. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
21. Dagenais, supra note 11 at 880.
22. [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 881. One court interpreting Dagenais has emphasized that jurors can
be trusted, under proper judicial instructions, to decide the fate of a criminally accused only on
the evidence admitted at trial. See Edmonton (City) v. Kara (1995), 164 A.R. 64 at 67, (Q.B.)
(unsealing affidavits concerning theft of millions despite objection of criminally accused
person subject to trial). Compare R. v. Warren (In re Canadian Broadcasting Corp.), [1995]
N.W.T.R. 133, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 698 (S.C.) (under Dagenais, television corporation and
newspaper allowed access to copy videotapes and similar evidence in now-concluded trial, but
with non-disclosure of evidence relating to accused not yet tried).
23. Dagenais, supra note I1 at 884.
24. Ibid. at 886.
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objective of the measure in question and its deleterious effects. Instead,
said the Dagenais court, "there must be a proportionality between the
deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the
rights of freedoms in question and the objective, and there must be a
proportionality between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the
measures."
25
Although I find the topics fascinating, let me forebear further reflec-
tion on the doctrinal differences between Canada and America on
constitutional balancing generally, as well as on the specific topic of
publication bans. Such bans, of course, concern the media, and our direct
concern this afternoon is with lawyers. But one can quickly see why in
Canada publication bans are closely linked to the topic of lawyers
communicating with the media: when the media itself can be restrained,
there is much less occasion to attempt independently to restrain lawyers.
Like a rising tide lifting all boats, imposition of a publication ban
removes much of the incentive of the media to talk to lawyers about their
pending cases .26 The media-being concerned with the news and not very
much at all with history-will not be terribly interested in the opinions of
lawyers once a case is concluded. And, as I understand it, arrest is usually
followed here in Canada rather promptly by the initiation of court
25. Ibid. at 889 (emphasis in original). Justice LaForest dissented on jurisdictional grounds,
adding comments generally agreeing with the Chief Justice on the common law publication ban
rule. Justice LaForest would, however, have added another factor to be weighed: "the extent
to which a ban could disrupt the trial, particularly by creating the risk that the trial would not
take place within a reasonable time." Ibid. at 894. That factor seems entirely consistent with
the approach of the Chief Justice. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also dissented on jurisdictional
grounds, and on the merits, largely agreeing with Justice Gonthier, would have found that the
common law rule providing for publication bans already incorporated the kind of balancing
that the majority required as a constitutional matter. Ibid. at 914-17. Justice Gonthier's dissent
(although agreeing with the Chief Justice that the court had jurisdiction) also focused on the
majority's test, particularly noting (ibid. at 924) that the discussion of the availability of
alternative measures such as sequestering the jury should not be understood to mean that the
bare existence of the alternative, regardless of its relative cost and other inconvenience, makes
a ban inappropriate. In the final analysis, Justice Gonthier would have affirmed the interme-
diate appellate court. Finally, Justice McLachlin would have gone beyond the Chief Justice's
analysis and found that the Charter applied (not through the common law) but directly to court
orders (ibid. at 941). In other respects, she essentially agreed with the result and analysis of the
Chief Justice.
The reaction of the Canadian media to the Dagenais decision was, by American
standards, strangely celebratory, given that the decision clearly contemplates publication bans
in some future cases. See "A Victory for Canada" Maclean's (19 Dec. 1994) 20.
26. Equally, although doubtless coincidentally, publication bans may also protect individual
lawyers involved in litigation. For example, in National Bank of Canada v. Melnitzer (1991),
5 O.R. (3d) 234, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 315 (Gen. Div.), a prominent lawyer involved in numerous
civil and criminal proceedings was entitled to protect the confidentiality of the transcript of a
meeting with a receiver by having it filed under seal in court. For procedural reasons, the
inquiring media publication was unable to raise any objection under the Charter.
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proceedings, thus empowering a judge to consider the need for a publi-
cation ban early in a criminal proceeding. I also detect a strong and widely.
held professional disapprobation of lawyer comment to the media.27 A
medium aware of the potential exercise of a judge's discretion to impose
a publication ban-and aware of the general sentiment against media
comment by advocates-is understandably reluctant to break new
journalistic ground.
In such a context, it is not surprising that one finds in Canadian
jurisprudence, to date, only the most fleeting mention of a problem of
overly-talkative advocates. When the point is raised in a rare judicial
opinion, it is for the purpose of excoriating such lawyerly waywardness. 28
This is done in a way that leaves little doubt that Canadian lawyers-
traditionally and perhaps now-would only invite judicial umbrage
should they engage in elaborate comments to the media arguing the
justice of their client's cause.
That view is confirmed in examining what Canadian lawyer codes
have to say about media comment. The post-Charter Code of Profes-
sional Conduct of the Canadian Bar Association states as a general rule
that:
Where the lawyer, by reason of professional involvement or otherwise, is
able to assist the media in conveying accurate information to the public, it
is proper for the lawyer to do so, provided that there is no infringement of
the lawyer's obligations to the client,29 the profession, the courts or the
administration of justice, and provided also that the lawyer's comments
are made bonafide and without malice or ulterior motive.3"
27. See infra text at notes 29-33.
28. See e.g. R. v. Basha (1978), 23 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 318 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) ("I must say that
I was appalled when it was brought to my attention that while the matter was subjudice there
was editorial comment in the press and participation by Counsel in a media program on this
matter. I have not read or viewed the editorials or program as a matter of deliberate policy, nor
does it affect or influence my decision in any way. However, I intend to pursue the matter when
sentencing is over and bring it to the attention of the Director of Public Prosecutions so that a
decision can be made whether or not to institute contempt proceedings. Whether it is contempt
or borders on contempt, lawyers are presumed to know better. As for the media, they are large
organizations with access to legal advice and are in a position to act more responsibly.").
29. Earlier, the Code makes the important, if obvious, point that before making a public
statement, the lawyer should be satisfied that any communication is in the best interests of the
client, and not to let any personal interest or other cause conflict with the client's interest:
Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
1988) at ch. 18, commentary 2. A lawyer is also prohibited from expressing a personal opinion
about the merits of the client's case. Ibid. at 3.
30. Ibid. at ch. 18, commentary 7. Other rules govern lawyer advertising. See infra text at
notes 125-30. Other rules in Chapter 18 provide more leeway to a lawyer in a non-legal setting
publicizing, for example, fund-raising efforts of a charitable organization (ibid. 8) or when
the lawyer serves as advocate for a special-interest group (ibid. 10).
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Very similar rules obtain in Nova Scotia under the Handbook for
Lawyers.31 While the professional rules evidence relaxation of the former
strict anti-comment rule, effected by the enactment in 1982 of the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms,3 2 it can fairly be said that they
are highly cautionary, obviously reflecting the professional belief that the
less said the better, particularly on a matter of litigation in which the
lawyer is involved as advocate.33
II. Advocates and the Media in America-
O.J. Simpson and Richard Jewell
Quite by contrast, lawyers in the United States have relatively much less
to restrain them in talking to the media than do lawyers in Canada. I want
to try to portray what I see as those differences in action through the use
of two short stories about lawyer comment to the media. I think these are
largely true stories. Unfortunately, I know of them only through the
media. Thus I must admit that my grasp may squeeze some fable and not
only historical truth out of them.
1. O.J. Simpson
I start, not with a bookkeeper, but with an icon, O.J. Simpson, whose
athletic exploits in American collegiate and professional football are, I
am sure, at least somewhat familiar even to fans of Canadian football. To
those South of the forty-ninth parallel, they are the stuff of sheer legend.
After his retirement from professional football, Simpson became a
thorough-going media celebrity-one of the highest-paid sports an-
nouncers and product endorsers. Fast forward to the present: in recent
weeks, a sufficient number of people have been found in Los Angeles
who profess to have no strong opinion of Simpson's guilt or innocence of
the murders of his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald
L. Goldman to populate a jury box for a second trial-this time dealing
31. See Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct-A Handbook for Lawyers in Nova Scotia
(1990), ch. 22. Among other things, the Handbook assumes greater latitude of a lawyer
involved in a litigated matter after final determination and once the case report has become a
matter of public record. See ibid. at commentary 22.11.
32. See G. MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1993) 31-1.
33. A report of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, "Giving Legal Advice on Radio and T.V."
is similarly cautionary about a lawyer's media appearances for the purpose of discussing
general legal issues. Among other things, the report recommends that before publicly
commenting on a matter in which the lawyer is professionally involved, the lawyer should have
the express permission of the lawyer's client. Ibid. at 277. Moreover, any comment on a
pending matter should not extend to "a likely outcome of any matters pending before the courts
or tribunals" or that "would have the effect of interfering with a fair hearing." Ibid.
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with accusations of wrongful death in a civil action for damages. That
proceeding, of course, follows the galvanizing34 and racially divisive
moment of Simpson's acquittal a year ago of the murder charges in the
notorious criminal trial before Judge Lance Ito. I have no wish here to
rehash the evidence; that process is already well underway in books and
articles.35 It has been repeated interminably on television and in the daily
press, often by trial participants-many of whom, it seems, are rushing
into print with books describing the case and its significance from their
own perspective.3 6
Instead, the single fascinating aspect of the O.J. Simpson trial on which
I now focus is the media role of his defence lawyers-and that of the
prosecutors. Even for Hollywood, the amount of attention paid to the
media by the lawyers was probably unparalleled in United States juris-
prudence. The motives of the immediate lawyer participants were, I
suspect, mixed. Surely much of the media leaks and camera posturing was
intended to advance the interests of the client-whether defendant or the
public-of the advocate in the media lights. But there seems to have been
more. It might be ungenerous, but my enduring impression is that much
of the publicity was driven by self-aggrandizement-attempts to project
the lawyer personally into the media world as heroic, clever, famous,
skilled. Interests of a specifically mercenary kind may also have played
34. One measure of the riveting attraction of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial is that at the
moment when the verdict was announced, 96 per cent of all American television sets that were
on were tuned to the trial. See R. Cossack, "What You See Is Not Always What You Get:
Thoughts on the O.J. Trial and the Camera" (1996) 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 555
at 556.
35. E.g. M.L. Rantala, Of. Unmasked: The Trial, the Truth, and the Media (Chicago: Open
Court, 1996) (attempted demonstration of strength of case against Simpson); L. Schiller &
J. Willwerth, American Tragedy: The Uncensored Story of the Simpson Defense (New York:
Random House, 1996) (story of defence efforts from perspective ofjournalists given extensive
access to defence efforts); J. Toobin, The Run of His Life: The People v. 01. Simpson (New
York: Random House, 1996). Simpson himself, of course, was one of the first to publish.
0. Simpson, I Want to Tell You (New York: Little, Brown, 1995).
36. A. Cooley, M. Ribin-Jackson & C. Bess, Madam Foreman: A Rush to Judgment?
(Washington: Dove, 1996) (group ofjurors); J. Cochrane, Jr.,Journey to Justice (Westminister,
MD: Ballantine Books, 1996) (co-lead defence counsel); R. Shapiro, The Search for Justice:
A Defense Attorney's Brief on the 0.. Simpson Case (1996) (defence counsel); C. Darden, In
Contempt (San Francisco, Harper Collins 1996) (assistant prosecutor); A Dershowitz, Reason-
able Doubts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) (law school professor and long-distance
defence consultant); M. Eliot & K. Kaelin, Kato Kaelin: The Whole Truth-The Real Story of
O.J., Nicole & Kato (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1995) (trial witness). The chief
prosecutor, Marcia Clark, negotiated an advance of $4.2 million for a book that reportedly will
be published soon. See Tabor, "The Media Business: Viking to Pay $4.2 Million for Book by
Marcia Clark" N.Y. Times (10 Nov. 1995) D6, col. 5. On the extensive media commentary
engaged in by both prosecution and defense in the Simpson case, see K. Cole and F. Zacharias,
The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, (1996) 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1627.
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a part-including that of generating publicity in order to gain clients,
either directly or through referrals from other lawyers.
The result in the O.J. Simpson case was the most persistent courting of
the media that I can recall in thirty-five years of observing the American
lawyering scene. A trip by Johnnie Cochrane, F. Lee Bailey, Robert
Shapiro and their colleagues to the courthouse was a parade of smiling,
photogenic lawyers volubly talking their way through a receptive gaunt-
let of television cameras and microphones. Few questions went unan-
swered. Few topics seemed off limits. The lawyers freely commented on
evidence, on the motives of prosecution lawyers, on witnesses who may
or may not testify and what they would say, and on whether or not they
were to be believed. The police and prosecutors had opened the proceed-
ings with the notorious "chase"-several hours of live television cover-
age of O.J. Simpson's slow-speed wanderings amidst the freeways of Los
Angeles, threatening to kill himself with a loaded revolver. The prosecu-
tor followed this up with periodic press conferences, which were charac-
terized by only slightly more restraint than the media efforts of the
defence lawyers. The Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti became
a fixture on the nightly television news almost as familiar as Marcia Clark
and Christopher Darden became due to gavel-to-gavel televising of the
trial itself. Perhaps the low point of this trough of publicity was reached
when defence lawyers Shapiro and Bailey went toe to toe in attributed and
leaked media announcements attacking each other's professional abili-
ties-apparently as part of a squabble about which lawyer was going to
''control" Simpson's defence.
The media attention paid to the Simpson charges was so intense that
by the time, at last, ajury was to be chosen, the only prospective juror who
professed not to have heard about the case was immediately suspected of
perjury in order to secure a seat on the jury. All other prospective jurors
had heard something about the case. Many had heard a great deal and
professed that their minds were made up, securing their absence from the
jury. The jury eventually chosen ended up being sequestered, because of
the threat of even more intensive media attention once the trial began.
2. Richard A. Jewell
The next story concerns a man whose most noted trait, quite unlike
Simpson, was his singular lack of distinction and, unlike Bernardo, his
innocence. 37 Dick Jewell's only claim to fame is that he was for a moment
37. See K. Sack, "A Man's Life Turned Inside Out by Government and the Media" New York
Times (28 Oct. 1996) AI, col. 1.
Lights, Camera, Litigate
a hero, and then for three months publicly accused of being a villain. He
was first noticed by the media as the result of a violent tragedy this 27 July
1996, when a pipe bomb left in a knapsack exploded in Centennial
Olympic Park in Atlanta during an evening of outdoor entertainment. The
bomb killed a woman and injured 111 others who were attending a late-
night rock and roll concert in a stadium-like structure. It was widely
reported that the toll of injury would have been much greater except for
Jewell's actions in warning people away from the abandoned bag.
Jewell's three-day career as hero was short-lived. On July 30, the
Atlanta Journal newspaper reported that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation had focused on him as a suspect in the bombing and that the FBI
had sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant. Within minutes,
television reporters (in their lemming-like way) were reading the Atlanta
Journal article about Jewell, verbatim and live, on national and interna-
tional news programs. In the days and months that followed, ever-ready
"experts" on criminal investigations were quoted in the media speculat-
ing about Jewell's past as a loner who lived with his mother and as a
wannabe police officer who had lost several security guard jobs because
of over-zealousness. They speculated that Jewell fit the profile of a man
with a hero complex who might create a deadly crisis in order to be hailed
later as a hero. The American media, like sharks to blood in the sea, went
into a feeding frenzy of coverage. Jewell could not leave his house
without a crush of media. A neighbor who lived immediately across the
street sub-leased his apartment to a consortium of television stations that
kept their cameras trained on Jewell' s front door twenty-four hours a day.
Thereafter, periodic "unidentified investigators with the FBI" announced
new indications that Jewell was their man. As to why Jewell himself
wasn't being arrested, the media experts replied confidently and smugly
that a common investigative tactic was to apply psychological pressure
on a suspect by letting him know the police had him in their cross-hairs
but then waiting to close in on him until after he had made a fatal mistake.
Jewell, apparently, didn't blink. Eventually, after three months of leaving
Jewell to live in the intrusive eye of the media, the FBI announced that he
was no longer a suspect. He was free again, presumably, to resume his role
as hero, but now one with an irreparably tarnished reputation.
Notable also in the media attention paid to Dick Jewell were his
lawyers-a criminal-defence lawyer retained to defend him against the
FBI's clumsy and highly questionable investigative tactics and two civil
lawyers who are preparing what the media has already concluded are civil
suits for substantial damages against the FBI and several media
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organizations.38 The part of the media campaign-for surely it was that-
that Jewell's lawyers mounted seemed, in comparison to the O.J. Simpson
lawyer publicity, more single-mindedly focused on the needs of the client
and not so much at all on the possible hope of the lawyers for personal and
professional fame. While one will never know for sure, it also seems that
their campaign was in part responsible for the action of the FBI in
dropping its investigation. Their steady resort to the media focused media
attention on the FBI's "public relations" problem: it had over-sold the
strength of its case against Jewell. In the end, it could be seen that there
was simply no evidence of his guilt, other than the kind of vague suspicion
that might attach in some minds to loners and other losers who find
themselves in the harsh and unaccustomed glare of unsought attention. It
seems that the FBI was driven, not by concrete evidence of Jewell's guilt,
but by the need to produce quick and dramatic results in their investiga-
tion of a very notorious crime.
Are the cases of O.J. Simpson and Richard Jewell typical of how the
criminal-defence bar handles representation of an accused in the United
States? Of course not. Newspapers and magazines in the United States have
become famously selective in the stories to which they will devote any
attention. Most criminal stories are of little media interest. Some are,
however, and those tend to be given media attention entirely out of proportion
to their importance in anything but, arguably, symbolic terms. Of those on
which the media pounces, most never get beyond local attention, although
locally notorious crimes can generate intense local media coverage.3 9 Some
few of those become the Simpson-Jewell of their day.4° For the rest, the
criminal-justice system operates in almost total obscurity, with little or no
media attention or other indication-beyond the presence of the immediate
participants-that the proceeding is "public" in nature.
38. Jewell's lawyers are reportedly preparing actions for libel against several of the media.
The Atlanta Journal has defended its report of the FBI investigation as accurate, lawful, and
moral. See Wittes, "Can Richard Jewell Make His Case?" Legal Times (4 Nov. 1996) 1, col. 3.
39. As I was preparing these remarks, two high-school aged women-invariably and
suggestively described in the media as "cheerleaders," based on their very part-time extra-
curricular activities-disappeared from a hamlet very near Ithaca. Only parts of their bodies
have been found. While only of momentary interest to the national media, the story of the
victims, the suspect, what had occurred, and possible evidence against him engrossed the local
newspaper and television media, until the suspect hanged himself in his cell. See e.g.
Clairborne and Tokasz, "Late Night Arrest Reported in Deaths of Two Dryden Teens" Ithaca
Journal (8 Oct. 1996) 1 A; Tokasz, "Andrews' Suicide Leaves Shock, Pain" Ithaca Journal (4
Nov. 1996) IA.
40. E.g. (1) The criminal charges against Jeff Gillooly, the husband of Tonya Harding,
concerning the assault on her skating rival, Nancy Kerrigan. See Jarvis, "An Overview of the
Hoevet Case" The Professional Lawyer (18 Nov. 1994) (account of defence of Gillooly's
lawyer, Ron Hoevet, against charges of violation of trial-comment rule). (2) The recurring
Lights, Camera, Litigate
Are the activities of the Simpson and Jewell lawyers permissible under
American codes of lawyer conduct? The answers vary, in interesting
ways, in the two cases. The exorbitant publicity-seeking of the Simpson
lawyers, it turns out, was perfectly permissible. The more modest and
client-focused efforts of Jewell's lawyers, ironically, may be more
problematical.
At the time of the Simpson trial, California-alone among the fifty
states and the District of Columbia-lacked a rule that in any way
regulated lawyer comment to the media. Every other jurisdiction had
rules limiting media comment, at least nominally. But even as the
Simpson case was beginning to unfold, some California lawyers and
many public officials bemoaned California's unique place. The Califor-
nia legislature quickly passed a measure requiring the state bar to prepare
a rule on lawyer comment.4' The bar drafted such a rule, although
reluctantly.42 The rule that the bar ultimately recommended would have
been one of the least restrictive in the United States. (It would have
applied only in jury-tried cases and would have required a stringent
showing of "clear and present danger" of trial disruption.43) Perhaps more
tuned to popular and legislative clamor, the California Supreme Court
rejected the bar's proposal as too soft. Instead, the court turned to the type
of media-comment rule now in effect in the other American jurisdictions,
precluding any statement that "will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."'
criminal charges against Michigan pathologist, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, for assisting suicides. See
Dubin, "A Chilling Ethics Rule" National L. J. (6 Feb. 1995) A23, col. 1 (report of bar
proceedings against Geoffrey Fieger, lawyer for Kevorkian). See generally Hoffman, "May It
Please the Public-Lawyers Exploit Media Attention as a Defense Tactic" N.Y. Times (22
April 1994) B 1, col. 2 (recording several historical incidents of lawyer use of publicity in
defence of client).
41. See "News Notes: Trial Conduct-Trial Publicity" (1994) 10 ABAIBNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct 280; Ainsworth, "Court Issues Tough Rule on Lawyers'
Media Statements" [San Francisco] Recorder (15 Sept. 1995) 1, col. 4.
42. See Jacobius, "Taming Talkative Attorneys: California Bar Proposes-But Dislikes-
Trial Publicity Rule" (Mar. 1995) 81 A.B.A.J. 22 (reporting 18-1 vote of barboard of governors
to send proposed rule to state supreme court, but with letter indicating that majority would
prefer not to have a rule).
43. See "News Notes: Ethics Rules-Trial Publicity," (1995) 11 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual
on Professional Conduct 39; Cox, "California Bar Proposes Curbs on Out-of-Court Speech"
NationalLJ. (26 Dec. 1994) All, col. 1. In proposing a clear-and-present-danger test, the bar
reportedly would have California join only Virginia and, arguably, the District of Columbia
and four other states that follow a related "serious and imminent threat" test. Ibid.
44. Calif. R. Prof. Conduct, Rule 5-120 (added 1995). See Ainsworth, supra note 41. The
original California bill that impelled the bar to act had proposed adoption of ABA Model Rule
3.6. See "News Notes: Trial Conduct-Trial Publicity" (1994) 1OABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual
on Professional Conduct 280.
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Which brings us to Richard Jewell's lawyers. They practice in Geor-
gia, a state that does have in force a rule restricting lawyer media
comment. How, then, could they engage in the intensive media campaign
that they in fact launched and successfully maintained? The answer is that
the media-comment rule in most American jurisdictions is a sieve with
very large holes. Some of the holes are there because of considerations of
fairness. The most important of them are there because of decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, which have substantially restricted the
ability of the bar and courts to suppress lawyer media comment.
It was not always like this. In the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics, lawyers
were strongly discouraged from talking to the press about pending
cases. 45 Lawyer wryness aside, then, the traditional rule has been that
cases are not to be tried in the press. At that, however, the stricture of the
A P A 'ano ,a , -rily, hrrt-for. The nevt nrc'nion nn Whirh the
ABA attempted-this time much more successfully-to propound na-
tional standards for lawyers was in 1969, when the ABA promulgated the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 46 The American professional
world in immediately preceding years had been convulsed by what for
that time was an instance, thought then to be unprecedented, 47 of savage
and intrusive media attack upon an accused in a criminal trial who was
probably innocent of the charged offence.48 Dr. Sam Sheppard's wife was
45. "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere
with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify
a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An exparte reference
to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court; but
even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any exparte statement." ABA Canons ofProfessional
Ethics (1908) Canon 20.
46. Events surrounding the origins of the ABA Model Code language on trial comments were
part of the building sense that lawyer regulation under the terribly dated 1908 Canons was
seriously deficient. On those events, see C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 2.6.3 (St. Paul,
Minn.: West, 1986).
47. It probably was not. The history of American law is checkered with periodic instances of
trials taking place under unrelenting glare of media publicity. The trial of Bruno Hauptmann
in 1935 for kidnaping the Lindberghs' child, for example, was captured on talkie moving-
picture film. The film clearly shows the bustle of other photo-journalists in the courtroom, their
flashbulbs popping as Hauptmann was grilled on cross-examination. Hauptmann was con-
victed and executed for a crime that many still believe he did not commit. N. Behn, Lindbergh:
The Crime (New York: NAL-Dutton, 1994).
48. Sheppard was acquitted at his subsequent retrial. In a book co-authored by his son, who
spent years investigating the death of Mrs. Sheppard, it is concluded that a known suspect, who
laterconfessed to the crime, was ignored by police investigators. See C. Cooper & S. Sheppard,
Mockery of Justice: The True Story of the Sheppard Murder Case (Boston: N.E.U. Press,
1995). The lawyer who was chiefly responsible for obtaining reversal of Sheppard's murder
conviction and obtaining his acquittal on retrial was F. Lee Bailey, who also served as defence
counsel for O.J. Simpson.
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murdered under mysterious circumstances. Dr. Sheppard had both mo-
tive and opportunity to kill her. There was also some evidence, of dubious
quality, connecting him to commission of the offence. The Cleveland-
area newspapers quickly launched what can only be described as a
concerted and relentless campaign to pressure the elected coroner to hold
a public inquest and the elected prosecuting attorney to file murder
charges against Dr. Sheppard. They succeeded, and in a continuing
"carnival atmosphere" of media attention that was pressed right into the
courtroom to within three feet of the jury box,49 Dr. Sheppard was tried
and convicted of murder despite his protestations of innocence.
Sheppard's conviction was subsequently reversed in one of several
periodic attempts by the United States Supreme Court to deal with the
problem of media freedom under the First Amendment to the federal
Constitution in light of the rights of the accused to a fair trial guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." The
court insisted that trial courts must take stem measures to correct for
prejudicial pretrial publicity-such as postponing the trial until the threat
to fair trial posed by adverse publicity abates or transferring the case to
another venue untainted by publicity.5 Beyond such measures, said the
Court, "[n]either prosecutors, counsel for defence, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction
of the court should be permitted to frustrate its functions. Collaboration
between counsel and the media as to information affecting the fairness of
a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable
and worthy of disciplinary measures. 5 2 Although its sweep is broad and
general, note, of course, that the "collaboration" to which the Court is
plainly referring in Sheppard is that between the prosecution and the
media, of which there was ample and undisputed evidence.
The Sheppard case led to appointment by the ABA leadership of a Fair
Trial and Free Press Advisory Committee.53 The recommendations of the
Committee were quickly approved and incorporated into Disciplinary
49. With the trial judge's permission, a table was set up within the area usually reserved for
lawyers and the jury box for the use of the media. It was between the jury box and the defence
table, preventing most confidential communication between Sheppard and his lawyer. Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,342-43 (1966). The names and addresses of prospective jurors were
published, leading to their receiving numerous phone calls and letters about the case. Ibid. at
353.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. at 362.
52. Ibid. at 363.
53. The committee's report became one of the original "minimum standards" of the ABA on
criminal justice. See ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards
Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1966).
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Rule 7-107 of the ABA's 1969 Model Code.54 In summary, the ABA
Code now made the no-comment rule mandatory, not hortatory, and the
Code purported to regulate what lawyers could state to the media. At least
under one reading, the only exceptions were for "tombstone"-like state-
ments to the media. Those could be only bare statements, "without
elaboration," of such dull items as information already contained in a
public record. Curiously, one exception permitted a lawyer to reply to
charges of misconduct against the lawyer, but did not extend to replies to
charges against the lawyer's client."
The ABA Disciplinary Rule was widely adopted in the states, but it
appears to have done little while it was in effect to stem a growing
proclivity of lawyers in notorious cases to comment to the media in ways
that could be justified under the rule only with considerable difficulty.56
The judicial response was tepid in general, with limited exceptions. In a
few cases, excessive media-statement-mongering by a prosecutor led to
reversal of a criminal conviction on the ground of an unfair trial57 or, very
rarely, to professional discipline.5 8 In general, the 1969 rule was soon
found to suffer from two serious defects (and several minor ones). First,
lower courts did not read the Sheppard v. Maxwell decision as giving
carte blanche to bar regulators to regulate lawyer media comments in the
generous way reflected in the ABA's disciplinary rule. Although the
54. See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-107 note 85 (1969).
55. ABA Model Code, DR 7-107(l). The 1983 ABA ModelRules also did not admit the client-
defence exception until its amendment in 1994. See infra text at notes 82-84.
56. Such out-of-court media statements hold other hazards. In some jurisdictions, a lawyer's
remarks at a press conference would not fall within the otherwise absolute privilege against suit
for defamation damages for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding. E.g. Asay
v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692,697 (8th Cir. 1979), and authority cited (publication of
defamation to news media not ordinarily sufficiently related tojudicial proceeding to constitute
privileged occasion); Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1984) (statements to
media not privileged); Lawrence v. Evans, 573 So.2d 695, 699 (Miss. 1990) (same).
57. E.g. United States v. Coast of Maine Lobster Co., 538 F.2d 899 (1 st Cir. 1976) (published
comment by supervising prosecutor during pendency of much-publicized white-collar crimi-
nal proceeding being tried by jury urging stern punishment of such crimes); Hughes v. State,
437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981) (prosecutor gave media interview referring to defendant's lie
detector test, published while jury was discharged over weekend).
58. E.g. In re Hansen, 584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978) (discipline of deputy attorney general-
since elected to office of state attorney general-for television comments on merits of pending
criminal case); compare, e.g. In re Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855 (Ore. 1983) (in banc) (prosecutor
commits violation only where evidence establishes that prosecutor intended remarks to create
seriously prejudicial beliefs in potential jurors); see also, e.g. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259 (1993) (only conditional, not absolute, privilege attaches to prosecutors' alleged act
of making defamatory statements at press conference announcing indictment of criminal
defendant); Rodrigues v. City of New York, 602 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (claim
that prosecutor released false information to media states cause of action for breach of civil
rights statute).
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lower court decisions were not entirely consistent, several respected
courts held that the First Amendment rights of lawyers would be infringed
by enforcement of the rule as written. 9 Second, under whatever cloud of
doubtful constitutionality the disciplinary rule itself might sit, it was
subject to being tugged and pulled in various directions. Its language was
hardly a model of precision and clarity. Varying judicial interpretations
and reluctance of bar-disciplinary bodies to proceed against apparently-
offending lawyers contributed to a sense among lawyers and informed
nonlawyers that the rule was largely hortatory, if not public eyewash, and
was not intended for serious, routine enforcement.
Within only ten years after the ABA had grappled with drafting the
1969 Model Code, another, different ABA commission was charged with
responsibility for revisiting their work, and, ultimately, replacing the old
Code root and branch with what became the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.6' In the process the drafting commission threw out
much of the 1969 Code, including the text of the Disciplinary Rule on
media comment. In replacing it, the drafters of the new rules attempted
to accomplish two objectives. First, they cleared out some of the under-
brush of vague language from the old Code formulation in an attempt to
assure that the resulting rule would withstand constitutional challenge.
Second, however-and somewhat inconsistently-, they still attempted
to emerge with a relatively broad media-comment rule that would permit
as little comment by advocates as was constitutionally permissible.
In the final analysis, the ABA's resulting Model Rule 3.6 seemed to
provide a standard for lawyer free expression more permissive than the
standard under the 1969 Model Code. To be sure, one still encounters
59. E.g. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1975); Wachsman v.Disciplinary Counsel, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20899 (S.D. Ohio
1991) (DR 7-107(G), prohibiting extrajudicial comment in civil cases, unconstitutional for
vagueness and overbreadth); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984) (DR 7-102 unconsti-
tutional on free-speech grounds); Markfield v. Ass'n of Bar of City of N.Y., 370 N.Y.S.2d 82
(N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dism'd, 337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1975) (discipline under DR 7-107
constitutionally permissible only when extrajudicial comment poses "clear and present
danger" to administration of justice). But see e.g. State v. Hinds, 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982)
("reasonable likelihood" standard of DR 7-107 can be applied, consistent with First Amend-
ment, to lawyer's extrajudicial comments harshly criticizing judge in political criminal trial).
60. On the drafting process in general, see T. Schneyer, "Professionalism as Bar Politics: The
Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct" (1989) 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 677. The
1983 Model Code rule on extrajudicial comment was itself preceded by still another, and more
stringent, ABA standard. See ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press section
8-1.1 (amended 1978). On the influence of the 1978 standards on the Model Rules, see ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct at 144 (proposed final draft, 30 May 1981). The final
version of the Model Rules explicitly acknowledge their provenance in the ABA Standards.
See ABA Model Rules, Rule 3.6, comment para. [21.
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instances in which lawyers are found to have violated the new rule.6' But
those are primarily cases of firebrands burning out of control, rather than
careful-or crafty-lawyers. The Code's old laundry list of permissible
items of public comment became instead a general rule prohibiting media
comment "if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding."62 A standard at least that permissive is minimally required
by the First Amendment. 63 But what little scope for regulation that Rule
3.6 seemed to give bar regulators, other subsections of the rule took away.
An immediately following subsection of the Rule listed seven items that,
even if they would have the otherwise forbidden prejudicial effect on the
proceeding, were nonetheless permitted topics of media comment by an
advocate. 64 Among the items on the permissible-comment list were
public statements about "information in a public record; '65 "a request for
assistance in obtaining evidence and information ' 66 necessary in the
litigation; "a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person
involved; '67 and, in a criminal case, "if the accused has not been
apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension". 6 Fairly
obviously, a prosecuting lawyer could hold a press conference early in the
proceedings, particularly before an arrest, even if the arrest was inevi-
table, and release damning information. While a defence lawyer was not
so obviously benefitted, both defence and prosecution lawyers rather
quickly grew to appreciate the flexibility of the permission to talk
publicly about "information contained in a public record. '69 A pattern
61. E.g. Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1994) (lawyer who sent copy of complaint
against law professor in fee-splitting dispute to newspaper at professor's law school subjected
to fee sanction, dismissal of complaint with prejudice, and referral to state disciplinary and
criminal authorities).
62. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.6(a).
63. At least the standard was found minimally constitutional in Gentile v. Nevada State Bar,
501 U.S. 1030 (1991). The lesser standard of the former DR 7-107 of the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, requiring only a finding ofa "reasonable likelihood" of material
prejudice to the proceeding (derived from a statement in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
363 (1966)), was held constitutionally insufficient in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.912 (1975), although it was upheld as
constitutionally sufficient in general in Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365-70 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc).
64. Model Rule 3.6(b).
65. Model Rule 3.6(b)(2).
66. Model Rule 3.6(b)(5).
67. Model Rule 3.6(b)(6).
68. Model Rule 3.6(b)(7)(iii).
69. See Snyder, supra note 2 at 405. For both defence lawyers and prosecutors, placing
something in the public record before commenting on it has the additional advantage of gaining
the protection of a privilege from liability for defamatory wrongs. Compare McNally v.
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developed in sensational trials7" of both prosecution and defence filing
numerous and quite voluminous motions prior to trial, often containing
information that under no stretch of the imagination would be admissible
in evidence. Once the dirt thus qualified as "information contained in a
public record," there was no prohibition against providing the informa-
tion to the media.
The ABA's 1983 trial-comment rule has led its own uneasy life. From
the beginning, doubts were expressed whether its enforcement would
survive constitutional challenge. Those prognostications proved accu-
rate when in 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada.7' Lawyer Gentile was defending a business person
indicted for the alleged offence of stealing drugs and cash worth $300,000
from a safe-deposit box that undercover police had surreptitiously rented
in the client's commercial storage facility for the purpose of running a
sting operation. The theft had been widely discussed in the media for the
better part of a year before the police at last arrested Gentile's client, the
facility owner. The day after his client's arrest, defence lawyer Gentile
called the first press conference of his career. There, he publicly stated-
naming names-that certain members of the police force, rather than his
client, had stolen the drugs and cash.72 (Pointing the finger at an alternative
Yarnall, 764 F.Supp. 853,856 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (underNew York law, absolute privilege), with
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F.Supp. 190, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (underPennsylvania law,
conditional privilege to make out-of-court statements if they constitute fair and accurate report
of statements made or documents filed in court, so long as person does not make statement for
sole purpose of causing harm to person defamed), citing authority.
70. Using public filings of inadmissible evidence, knowing that the media would quickly
publicize the information, was employed by the prosecution in the William Kennedy Smith
rape trial in Florida. See K. Jost, "Judges Should Gag the Gag Order" Christian Science
Monitdr (5 Aug. 1991) 19; D. Kaplan, "In Florida, Trial by Media Fire" Newsweek (5 Aug.
1991) (prosecutor's unsealed filing of inadmissible statements by three other women claiming
assault by Kennedy).
71. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) [hereinafter Gentile]. It is a staple fixture of American constitu-
tional jurisprudence that decisions of the Supreme Court on vexing constitutional issues are
decided by a closely divided court. Gentile was no exception. The majority decision of Justice
Kennedy was fully concurred in by three other justices. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with three
other justices, dissented. Justice O'Connor concurred in Justice Kennedy's opinion in part
(sufficiently to overturn the Nevada rule, and thus the disciplinary sanctions against Gentile),
but also concurred in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in part. For a close analysis of the
opinions see J. Daly, "What Can the Defense Attorney Say at a 'Pre-formal Charge' Press
Conference?" (1991) 15 Am. J. Tr. Advocacy 269 at 278-88.
72. The claim is not, of course, implausible. In numerous instances reported in the media,
police have been implicated in similar crimes. "Merced Police Officer Gets 10-Year Prison
Sentence" Fresno (Cal.) Bee (7 Nov. 1995) B3 (federal-court conviction of 20-year police
officer for theft of sixty-six pounds of cocaine from evidence locker); S. Ladd, "Bad Deeds
Haunting Bad Cop" (Long Island) Newsday (10 Nov. 1993) 4 (sentencing of detective on elite
anti-drug force for theft of drug money and arranging sale of heroin stolen by other officers
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suspect is common defence strategy, and has been found in many of the
most famous cases of trial publicity.73) Gentile's client was acquitted by
a jury. But lawyer Gentile was then prosecuted by the Nevada bar
disciplinary authorities for violation of Nevada's anti-comment rule,
which was almost identical74 to the ABA's Model Rule 3.6.
Gentile received a private reprimand, which became public when he
appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found two defects in
the Nevada rule, although only one justice agreed with both determina-
tions, and the two rulings must be teased out of what are otherwise
dissenting opinions (on minority propositions). In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, five members of the court held that the standard
employed in the Nevada/ABA rule to describe impermissible public
statements by lawyers-those posing a substantial likelihood of material
prejudice to the proceeding-was constitutional as a general matter.75 But
a different five-justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held
that the "safe harbour" portion of the Nevada/ABA rule was unconstitu-
tional because its terms were impermissibly vague.76 That 5-4 ruling on
from evidence locker); U.P.I., "Two Ex-cops Charged in Shore Drug Rings" (13 Feb. 1991)
(charges against police officers for, among other drug activities, theft of marijuana from
evidence locker at police headquarters).
73. Sam Sheppard's lawyers went public with a story about a "bushy-haired intruder" who
allegedly knocked Dr. Sheppard unconscious after murdering his wife. See supra note 48 at 25.
O.J. Simpson's attorneys spun a vague and highly conjectural story about possible involvement
of drug dealers supplying a friend of Simpson's murdered ex-wife. In the paradigm murder
case, Regina v. Courvoisier, defence counsel for a valet-butler accused of murdering his noble
English master attempted to create the impression at trial that the real perpetrator was a maid
(who was not charged). See D. Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer (St. Paul, Minn.: West,
1973) at 185-86. Perhaps their strongest argument was that the police had botched the
investigation of Lord Russell's death, and were subject to impeachment for bias (there because
of their interest in earning a reward for obtaining Courvoisier's conviction). Courvoisier's trial
was, interestingly, also preceded by sensational publicity, ibid. at 25-32, including some
counter-publicity generated by the defence lawyers, ibid. at 69.
74. Gentile, supra note 71 at 1033 (concurring opinion).
75. Ibid. at 1063-76. See also ibid. at 1081-82 (concurring opinion of O'Connor J.). With
concurrence of only four justices, the dissenting portion of the Rehnquist opinion also would
have found that the safe harbour provisions were not unconstitutionally broad or vague. Ibid.
at 1076-81.
76. Ibid. at 1048-51 and 1058; see also ibid. at 1082 (concurring opinion of O'Connor J.). In
the dissenting portion of his opinion, Justice Kennedy and three other justices would also have
found that the "substantial likelihood" test of Model Rule 3.6 was minimally constitutional,
despite operating as a prior restraint on lawyers, on their assumption that it "approximated" the
"clear and present danger" test. Ibid. at 1037. That test involves self-conscious balancing of the
imminence and magnitude of the danger claimed to flow from the utterance and the likelihood
that it will occur against the need for free and unfettered expression, weighing as well the
possibility that other measures will serve the state's interests. Ibid. at 1036. At least in cases
with similar facts involving punishment of pure speech in the public forum and directed at
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vagueness was enough to defeat the attempt to discipline Gentile.77 But
clearly the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist establishes the general
constitutionality of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard as an appropriate test for lawyer media comment (as opposed to
media comment by others).78
Gentile has not meant the end of attempts to discipline perceived
violations of the anti-comment rule. Occasional decisions can be found
in which courts find violations. 79 Nonetheless, discipline appears to be
quite rare, with several courts, faithful to the Supreme Court majority,
requiring a demonstration of each of the rule's elements, including the
required demonstration that the lawyer's remark in fact had a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing the trial. 8° There seems to be wide-
spread professional belief-at least among many segments of the Ameri-
can legal profession-that there is no effective prohibition against
improper media comments by lawyers involved in cases.
It was not until August 1994 that the AB A finally responded to the need
to repair the professional rules in light of Gentile.8 The ABA House of
Delegates voted to amend ABA Model Rule 3.6 in several respects:
public officials, see ibid. 1034, lawyers would thus have been more nearly on the same footing
as journalists with respect to the power of courts to restrain their out-of-court media comments.
With respect to the Kennedy majority's rulings on vagueness, the defective words were
those in the safe-harbour provision stating that a lawyer "may state without elaboration. . . the
general nature of the. .. defense" (see ibid. at 1048). The majority focused particularly on the
words "elaboration" and "general," finding that, as the provision was applied by the Nevada
court, the rule was so imprecise that discriminatory enforcement was a real possibility. Ibid.
at 1051.
77. Left, unfortunately, unresolved by the opinions (due to the limited concurrence of Justice
O'Connor) was the question whether the evidence supported the Nevada court's finding that
Gentile's statements presented a substantial likelihood of causing material prejudice. Compare
Gentile, ibid. at 1038-48 (opinion of Kennedy J. and three other justices) with ibid. at 1079-
81 (opinion of Rehnquist C.J. and three other justices).
78. The reaction of law review writers to the Gentile (Rehnquist) majority has been,
predictably, mixed. Among the critical reviews, see e.g. Cooper, "Gentile v. State Bar and
Model Rule 3.6: Overly Broad Restrictions on Attorney Speech and Pretrial Publicity" (1993)
6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 583.
79. E.g. UnitedStates v. Bingham, 769 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. I11. 1991) (on eve ofjury selection,
criticizing judge's order that names of jurors in prosecution of gang members were to remain
anonymous, intimating that prosecutor's motive in obtaining anonymity order was to convey
to jury sense that defendants were dangerous people).
80. E.g. Re Sullivan, 586 N.Y.S. 2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (statements of defence lawyer
in highly publicized multiple-murder trial did not create sufficient risk of prejudice because gist
of information came to jury in another fashion and jury was strenuously admonished to ignore
media accounts of trial).
81. Early drafts of a proposed amendment circulated by the ethics committee would have
attempted only to rework vague language that the Gentile majority found objectionable. Those
efforts provided unsuccessful when the ABA's Criminal Justice Section referred the draft to
consultants, who could not agree on the meaning of the new language. The section then urged
the ethics committee to rework Model Rule 3.6 more extensively. See "News and Background:
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(1) eliminating the old subsection (b) list of particular statements covered
by the general rule of subsection (a); (2) modifying the set of "safe
harbour" statements in what is now Rule 3.6(b) by eliminating the
"without elaboration" qualification; (3) modifying the safe harbour list
by removing the former rule's limitation of statements to "general"
statements about the nature of the claim or defence and moving the list
from its former position as part of the disciplinary rule itself to explana-
tory commentary; and (4) explicitly providing, in a new Subsection (c) a
right of reply, or, perhaps more descriptively, a right of fair retaliation. 2
The fair-retaliation rule had been first and continuously urged by the
ABA's Criminal Justice Section,8 3 which was in a position to secure its
viewpoint as co-sponsor of the proposed language along with the ABA's
ethics committee.84 It remains to be seen whether the new ABA provi-
sions will be adopted in many states and, if adopted, whether they will
withstand renewed constitutional challenge.85
Gentile, it bears repeating, involved media comment about a criminal
case. Suppose the underlying matter had been a civil dispute. Can the state
suppress lawyer speech as readily in non-criminal matters? What Ameri-
can authority there is suggests that here regulation is particularly suspect
and difficult to sustain.86 There is also some indication that sanctions are
Model Rule Changes Suggested on Trial Publicity, Misconduct" (1993) 9ABAIBNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct 222 at 223.
82. ABA Model Rule 3.6(c) (as amended, August 1994): "(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a),
a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect
a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the
lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to
such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity." The last sentence
seems merely to reiterate the point already made about statements "required to protect a client"
in the first sentence. Obviously, the rule bristles with unanswered questions about how "recent"
adverse publicity must be, concerning linkages between a client's earlier statements and more
recent adverse publicity, and whether and to what extent attacks on an opposing party or its
witnesses or position is encompassed within permissible retaliation.
83. See D. DeBenedictis, "Gentile's Unanswered Questions: Drafters Struggle to Rewrite
Ethics Rules on Lawyers' Out-of-Court Statements" (April 1993) 79 A.B.A.J. 28.
84. See "Trial Publicity, Certification Face Proposed Rule Changes" (1994) 10 ABA/BNA
Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 126 at 127.
85. For a review of remaining constitutional problems in the post- 1994 ABA Model Rule 3.6,
see G. Gregg, "ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed Approach to the Problem
of Trial Publicity" (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1321.
86. See Wachsman v. Disciplinary Council, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20899 (S.D. Ohio 1991),
citing Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (DR 7-107(G) prohibition
against media comment in civil matter unconstitutional); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1975); Shadid v. Jackson,
521 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Tex. 1981). The "overbreadth" basis for the finding of unconstitution-
ality in Wachsman (at p. 12) does not foreclose the possibility that a more narrowly drawn rule,
such as the ABA's Model Rule 3.6, would be found sufficiently narrow.
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much more appropriate when the case is being tried by a jury, rather than
by a judge or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, by a profes-
sional hearing officer or similar functionary. In fact the American Law
Institute's draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers would limit
the rule to adverse impacts on lay fact finders or on witnesses (as where
the trial publicity would have the effect of intimidating a witness).87
Finally, there seems to be broad, but hardly universal, agreement that the
prohibition may and should be imposed more strenuously to limit media
comment by a prosecutor (as compared to a criminal-defence lawyer or
to lawyers involved in civil proceedings).88 In the case of prosecutors,
there is hardly the same strength to an argument of free-expression rights
and no great need for access to the media, given the availability of the
police to comment.89
3. Gag Orders-Travails of Bruce Cutler90
There is one more piece of the American picture that deserves comment.
To this point we have encountered little effective regulation of American
lawyers who engage in extensive media comment. Even in situations in
which public comment might otherwise be objectionable under the
"substantial prejudice" standard, a lawyer of even modest professional
ability who bothers to look at the professional rule can rather readily
conduct a press conference under it and thus effectively evade or ignore
the spirit of the rule at will. If that is correct, those lawyers who remain
subject to the rule will be only those rash or unknowing lawyers who
speak at length to the media without structuring the situation to comply
with the rule.
But enter at this point a much more effective, although rarely-
employed, tool. Courts around the United States have held that they are
empowered to enter so-called "gag orders"-judicial restraining orders
prohibiting a lawyer (or another trial participant, such as a party or
witness) from publicly speaking. To date, the United States Supreme
Court has not yet passed on the constitutionality of lawyer gag orders, at
87. See ALl Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 169 (council draft no. 12, 1996).
88. See ibid. § 169(2) ("A prosecutor shall, except for statements necessary to inform the
public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused."). The Restatement draft
closely follows the text of the ABA's version of Model Rule 3.8(g) (as amended 1994).
89. United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780, 795-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), and authority cited.
See generally S. Matheson, "The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech" (1990) 58 Fordham
L. Rev. 865 (extensive survey of cases and theories).
90. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Cutler].
398 The Dalhousie Law Journal
least in the context of a gag imposed against statements to the media.9' In
one view, they are suspect, perhaps highly suspect. In a series of cases the
Court has explicitly ruled that gag orders issued by trial judges against the
media will be upheld only in extreme and clearly demonstrated circum-
stances of unavoidable need to prevent an unfair trial.92 Nonetheless, gag
orders against lawyers are, in comparison with media gag orders, much
more common. A lawyer complaining about the constitutionality of a gag
order would have to overcome the powerful argument, accepted in one
sense or another by most if not all the justices in the Gentile case, that
lawyers are subject to special regulation of their speech in cases in which
they appear as advocate. 93
91. The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), did hold that it was
impermissible for a lower federal court to enter a gag order prohibiting a lawyer who
purported to be representing a class in a class action from communicating with members of
the class who were not already the lawyer's clients. The court did so, however, on the ground
that such an order was inconsistent with the general federal rule on class actions, rather than
on any free-expression or other broad ground that would extend to media gag orders.
92. In a series of cases, the Court has struck down media gag orders, indicating either that
the statute, rule or order in question was overbroad or that the situation did not present a
sufficiently dire need for suppression. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976) (broad order of trial judge, in multiple-murder trial that had attracted widespread news
coverage, restraining many media organizations from publicizing described facets of case;
such orders presumptively invalid and party seeking to sustain bears heavy burden of
justifying need for restraint). Other decisions have held that a trial judge has the power to close
a courtroom, on the joint application of the defendant and the prosecutor, with respect to a
pretrial hearing on matters whose publicizing could prejudice the accused. See Gannett Inc.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). On the other hand, even with concurrence of the parties,
it would be impermissible to exclude the public and the media from the trial itself, Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), or even from a preliminary hearing, at
least in the absence of a showing of a compelling need to do so because of a substantial
probability of prejudice to the fair-trial rights of the accused, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
93. The opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Gentile rests solidly on the extensive and
traditional power of courts to regulate lawyers in proceedings before them. See supra note 71
at 1066-76 (Rehnquist C.J.). Justice O'Connor seems to join those positions. See ibid. at
1081-82 ("I agree with much of the Chief Justice's opinion. In particular, I agree that a State
may regulate speech by lawyers representing clients in pending cases more readily than it may
regulate the media. Lawyers are officers of the court and, as such, may legitimately be subject
to ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally
protected speech .... ).
Although he does not endorse the special-regulation notion, Justice Kennedy's minority
opinion stresses at various points that the closer a lawyer's statements to the time at which
a jury is to be chosen, the stronger the case for regulation. See ibid. at 1036 ("... Interpreted
in a proper and narrow manner, for instance, to prevent an attorney of record from releasing
information of grave prejudice on the eve of jury selection, the phrase substantial likelihood
of material prejudice might punish only speech that creates a danger of imminent and
substantial harm .. "); ibid. at 1044 (relevance that Gentile's statements were known by him
to precede jury selection by at least six months).
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A useful illustration of the possible use of a lawyer gag order is New
York City lawyer Bruce Cutler, who fought a losing94 media campaign in
support of his criminal-defence client, Mafia boss John Gotti. At a press
conference announcing Gotti's indictment, the United States attorney
called Gotti a "murderer, not a folk hero" and boasted that, unlike past
unsuccessful efforts to imprison Gotti, this time the government had
evidence, including extensive wiretap evidence,95 that was much stron-
ger. Not to let his client be outdone, lawyer Cutler began an intensive
media campaign that he described as designed to reach the jury in the
eventual trial. 96 The prosecutor then began to complain, and would do so
on several other occasions, about Cutler's media statements-which
must initially have struck the court as coming with ill grace after the
prosecutor's inaugural press conference. 97 In any event, the trial judge
eventually entered "in essence, a kind of gag order."98 Notwithstanding
the court's order, Cutler forged ahead with his media campaign, culmi-
nating in a one-hour appearance on a live local television program. All
this occurred in the weeks immediately before jury selection was to begin.
The trial court's conviction of Cutler for contempt of the court's order
was upheld on appeal.
Cutler's attempt to argue that the gag order was in violation of the
United States Constitution was unsuccessful. He was faced with insur-
Both the State of Nevada and the United States Solicitor General as amicus curiae had
contended as a central proposition that lawyers occupy a special status in the judicial system
that permits greater restriction on their comments consistently with the Constitution. See Tuite,
"A Slip of the Lip" (April 1991) A.B.A.J. 120.
94. Despite Cutler's media efforts, Gotti was ultimately convicted and sentenced to life in
prison for a number of racketeering charges, including murder of a gang rival. See United States
v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1646 (1994).
95. Those interested can read extensive excerpts in The Gotti Tapes (New York: Random
House, 1992) rushed to book stores, although apparently only after Gotti's conviction, perhaps
because they were not released by the court until then. Presumably unknown to the faithful
lawyer Cutler was the now-public taped comment of his apparently ungrateful client Gotti, "I'd
like to kill all the lawyers" (The Gotti Tapes at I 11), echoing Shakespeare's Dick the butcher
in Henry VI, Part 11, IV, ii ("The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.").
96. Normally, whatever one's private doubts, one would hesitate to ascribe such motives to
a lawyer. However, in a recorded law school symposium before the trial began, lawyer Cutler
plainly admitted as much. See Cutler, supra note 90 at 837 (quoting excerpt). In this respect,
the case was similar to Gentile, in which the lawyer had also candidly admitted that his press
conference was designed, in part, to deal with his concern that a potential jure venire would be
poisoned by adverse media based on press releases from the police and prosecutors. See
Gentile, supra note 71 at 1042 (opinion of Kennedy J.).
97. Perhaps because of the prosecutor's own unclean hands, the prosecutor had to complain
about Cutler in four separate letters before the court acted. See Cutler, ibid. at 830. On the other
hand, the trial court might have felt that he needed an extensive record of Cutler's violations
before he could enter a gag order.
98. Ibid. The lower court opinion, United States v. Cutler, 840 F.Supp. 959 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
is clearer on the specific orders violated.
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mountable procedural problems of his own devising. 9 The state of the
law on gag orders was also adverse."°° The court found that the trial
court's order possessed the required qualities of reasonable definiteness
and specificity,0 ° that Cutler's comments were reasonably likely to
prejudice the proceedings,'02 and that Cutler had acted with specific intent
consciously to disregard an order of the court.0 3
The American media has nothing but antipathy for gag orders, and
undoubtedly part of that antipathy extends to gag orders against lawyers.
Any gag order threatens the media generally, as do all instances of prior
restraint."° More specifically, a lawyer gag order can have serious
secondary effects involving the media, such as exposing the media to
extensive discovery by the lawyer when accused of violating it. 05 A
lawyer gag order has operational significance for the media, because it
silences a source that is knowledgeable, and who, as professionals who
make their living with words, can often be counted on to provide punchy
and quotable statements. 106
Are lawyer gag orders as vulnerable to constitutional attack as are gag
orders addressed to the media itself?'0 7 In an important sense, Cutler's
case is not adequately illustrative of American law on lawyer gag orders.
Cutler foreclosed himself from making the strongest possible argu-
ment, 108 and in fact the appellate court did not directly consider possible
99. Foremost among them was that Cutler had failed to challenge the trial court's gag order
when it was entered. See supra note 90 at 832-33; see also United States v. Cutler, 815
F.Supp. 599 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting Cutler's post-citation constitutional attack on the trial
court's order on the ground that he neglected to attempt to narrow or challenge the order when
it was made, but waited until it was enforced against him).
100. Cutler, ibid.
101. Ibid. at 834-35.
102. Ibid. at 835-37.
103. Ibid. at 837-38. Among other considerations, the appellate court held that Cutler was
held to a higher standard than would be a nonlawyer, and that his wilfulness could be inferred
from his reckless disregard for his professional duty. Ibid. at 837.
104. The media were reportedly distressed by the discovery ruling in Cutler, see note 105,
infra, believing that it stripped away protection it had previously enjoyed and thus raising free-
expression concerns. See Geyelin, "Court Limits Shield of Reporters' Notes in Criminal
Trials" Wall St. J. (28 Sept. 1993) B5, col. 1 (news report of reactions by media sources).
105. See United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993) (in decision before main Cutler
decision, appeals court holds that lawyer accused of violating gag order entitled to discover
reporters' notes of statements allegedly made by lawyer as well as outtakes from televised
interviews, although not to notes or outtakes of interviews with prosecution).
106. Lawyer gag orders also implicate much broader questions of policy and constitutionality
with respect to sealing or protective orders prohibiting public disclosure of information learned
in civil lawsuits, typically through discovery. E.g. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John
Labatt Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (lawyer held in civil and criminal contempt for
disclosure to newspaper reporter of confidential information learned in discovery).
107. See supra text at note 92.
108. See supra text at note 99.
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constitutional challenges that he might have had to the trial court's order.
Suffice it to say, however, that in another jurisdiction, 109 with a more
modem, post-Gentile" 10 local rule and specific and supportable findings
by the trial court of a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the proceed-
ings, a similar gag order would probably be upheld.I" In fact, such gag
orders are now relatively common in sensational cases that attract vast
media coverage-such as the Oklahoma City bombing case' 12 and the
109. Cutler was convicted of violating several court orders directing him to comply with the
standing rule of the Eastern District trial court on trial comment. See the lower court opinion
in United States v. Cutler, supra note 98 at 961. If Cutler had not waived the point, an argument
by the prosecution in support of the constitutionality of the trial court's order would have
suffered from at least two major problems. First, the trial court simply "incorporated by
reference" the local rule on lawyer media comment, without any attempt to tailor it to the
particular case before him. Second, and more importantly, the incorporated rule, as with the
New York state rule, N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-107(b), was (and is now)
based on the outdated 1969 ABA Model Code. Both rules list six types of prohibited statements.
But, in Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365-68 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), the court had held
that a substantially similar per se prohibition against certain types of speech, regardless of the
circumstances, was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Second Circuit,
apparently accepting that analysis, was able to save the New York rule by interpreting it as
merely creating a rebuttable presumption that the six categories of speech created a reasonable
likelihood of prejudicing the proceedings. See supra note 90 at 835-36.
110. See supra text at notes 81-85.
111. See e.g. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding gag order in
Wedtech investigation into alleged fraud in contractor qualification for federal program for
minority-owned businesses); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct., 781
F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (gag orderon lawyer in espionage case); In reRussell, 726 F.2d 1007
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 113-18
(1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969); United States v. Bingham, 769 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. 111. 1991); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d
439 (Ohio 1990) (child custody suit prone to media attention); contra Levine v. United States
District Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (gag order can be entered against lawyers, but only
on finding of either clear and present danger or serious and imminent threat to right to fair trial,
order must be narrowly drawn, and less-restrictive alternatives must be absent), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637 (Hawaii, 1992); see also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,360-63 (1966) (dicta); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra note 92
at 564 (dicta). One of the most liberal members of the Warren Court spoke approvingly of the
possibility of gag orders against counsel:
As officers of the court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to
engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will
obstruct the fair administration of justice. It is very doubtful that the court would not
have the power to control release of information by these individuals in appropriate
cases and to impose suitable limitations whose transgression could result in disciplinary
proceedings.
Ibid. at 601, note 27 (Brennan J. concurring) (citations omitted).
112. See e.g. "Judge Gags Attorneys in Oklahoma City Bomb Case" Reuters North America
Wire, (13 June 1996) (Nexis); Romano, "McVeigh Can't Talk to Media: Bombing Trial Judge
Rules Out Interviews," Washington Post (5 Oct. 1996) A4. On the order, see United States v.
McVeigh, 931 F.Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1996).
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O.J. Simpson civil trial,'"3 both of which are now ongoing. In fact, gag
orders may become the most-relied-upon device for dealing with threat-
ened pretrial publicity by American lawyers."4
What, then, is the presently-prevailing American rule on lawyer media
comment? One thumbnail description that has been offered is that the
traditional norm of "no comment" has been changed to one of "fair
comment.""' 5 That may be descriptive of what one might gather from
reading the lawyer codes, but it hardly reflects what is going on under the
glare of television cameras on courthouse steps in many notorious trials.
Fairness is, obviously, a highly elastic concept. In addition, fairness takes
on a much sharper edge because of the "public record" exception to the
comment rule 16 and due to the August 1994 amendment to the ABA's
rule, explicitly adding the notion of fair retaliation against adverse
publicity. 17 If retaliation is allowed, fairness must now be assessed, not
on its own terms, but on what is reasonably appropriate in light of what
has already been said or written in court filings or by way of responding
to whatever nonsense or venom might have already been published in any
segment of the media and against the legal, reputational, economic, or
other interests of one's client. Rather obviously, American lawyers with
a disposition to do so have proceeded, and will continue to proceed-
even in California with its new rule-unrestrained by general rules and
subject to effective muzzling only by narrowly drawn and case-specific
gag orders.
Aside from such specific threats, all that is left to instil fear in publicity-
hungry advocates is the possibility that a judge will not appreciate the
broad scope of permissible media comment, and accordingly will enter
a disciplinary order against a lawyer under a too-loose standard. Many
American judges are obviously unhappy with the current Gentile state of
the anti-comment jurisprudence. Lawyers are fully aware of this, some-
times because a trial judge will indicate concern with early attempts by
lawyers in a case to engage in media comment. Lawyers are then
threatened with two things. First, they fear arousing the judge sufficiently
to enter a gag order that will unequivocally prevent further statements
113. See infra text at notes 133-42.
114. For an argument that states should repeal their anti-comment rule in their lawyer codes
and rely entirely on gag orders in individual cases in which a need exists, see L. Weisberg, "On
a Constitutional Collision Course: Attorney No-Comment Rules and the Right of Access to
Information" (1992) 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 644 at 670-82.
115. W. Fortune, R. Underwood & E. Imwinkelried, Modern Litigation and Professional
Responsibility Handbook (New York: Little, Brown, 1996) at 279.
116. See supra text at notes 65 and 69-70.
117. See supra text at notes 82-85.
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entirely. Second, they fear being held in contempt or being disciplined,
leaving themselves the expensive and uncertain option of appellate
review in which they might raise their constitutional objections.
Nonetheless, the course of Supreme Court and lower court decisions
on lawyer free speech stands in contrast to the free-speech jurisprudence
applicable to most other United States citizens and certainly to the media
itself.'" In fact, a pundit has noted" 9 that the limited free-speech protec-
tion for lawyers in Gentile was announced in the same term of court in
which the Supreme Court also refused to accede to the free-speech claims
of nude dancers. 12 Those decisions stand in strange contrast to a later
claim by the U.S. Supreme Court that Gentile accorded "speech by
attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the stron-
gest protection the American Constitution has to offer....
What is it, then, that explains the half-baked free-speech rights of
lawyers with respect to trial comment? The answer is hinted at in various
opinions of the federal courts and trumpeted more loudly in occasional
state-court opinions. Lawyers have traditionally been subject to exten-
sive regulation by the states, particularly with respect to litigation
activities. 22 Moreover, as an opinion in Gentile stated, "lawyers' state-
ments are likely to be received as especially authoritative" because
"lawyer have special access to information through discovery and client
communications.' 23 The statement is puzzling. One would think it an
argument in support of lawyer free speech, not supporting its suppression
(unless the speech were knowingly false, which is another matter alto-
gether-since none of the media-comment rules has ever been concerned
that much of the speech it suppresses is accurate speech). In a more
limited way, however, the comment is telling, because it indicates why
lawyer speech is likely to have a particularly powerful effect on prospec-
tive jurors, if the fairness of the proceedings is indeed given primary
emphasis.'24
118. See supra text at note 92.
119. See D. Stewart, "Skeptical About Speech" (April 1991) 77 A.B.A.J. 50.
120. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (state statute requiring at least
pasties and g-strings does not impermissibly infringe free-expression rights of dancing
establishment or individual dancers).
121. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995).
122. Ibid.
123. Gentile, supra note 71 at 1074 (majority opinion).
124. Cutler, supra note 90 at 836.
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III. Comparisons Between Canada and America
What does one extract from this as a comparative matter, comparing
Canada and the United States? First, will Canada become California? On
that, I would say, there is the chance of a snowball not melting in
downtown Los Angeles-or, pointing metaphor in the opposite direc-
tion, the chance of L.A.-style Santa Anna winds sweeping in from the
East to roast Halifax. Beyond climate, the professional setting and
general cultural environment that produced the kind of lawyer commen-
tary found in the O.J. Simpson case is both perfectly predictable in
California and hardly thinkable in Canada.
To be sure, there are some indications that the Canadian legal profes-
sion has cast off some of its familiar moorings and is being carried by
powerful tides to destinations that it might not otherwise choose for itself.
A prominent example of such signs is the current state of lawyer
advertising in Canada-an arguably analogous area of free expression.
As I understand it, the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to pass directly
on the constitutionality of professional restrictions on lawyer advertising.
Nevertheless, the Canadian Bar Association has read rather obvious tea
leaves from the Court suggesting that section 2(b) of the Charter imposes
significant limits on such advertising restrictions. 25 Accordingly, the
Canadian Bar Association's current Code now recognizes that lawyer
advertising must be allowed in the interest of improving access to legal
services on the part of the mass of citizens unsophisticated in finding
individual lawyers through personal contacts or general reputation.126
The Provinces have fallen into obedient line, whipped, if by nothing else,
by the realization that resistance would only mean a possibly exuberant
decision very broadly upholding the constitutional right of lawyers to
advertise. By dint of anticipated applications of section 1 of the Charter,
however, the permission comes with conditions-particularly condi-
tions, found in very few American lawyer codes, that exhort lawyers
either not to advertise or to do so only in a dignified and restrained
manner. 127 For example, advertising that is done must, according to the
Ontario code, be "in good taste and not such as to bring the profession or
the administration of justice into disrepute," and must not compare the
advertising lawyers' services or charges with those of other lawyers. 28 In
125. E.g. Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232
(regulations limiting dentists' advertising to only name, address, telephone number and, on
business cards only, office hours struck down under s. 2(b)).
126. C.B. Ass'n Code, ch. XIV, commentaries I & 2 (1987).
127. E.g. Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1996) Rule 12, commentary 4.
128. Ibid., commentary 2(b) & 2(c).
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Manitoba, the appellate court, soon after the Charter came into effect,
upheld mandatory pre-screening of proposed advertising after subjecting
the requirement to the Charter's section 1 analysis.2 9 By report, disci-
pline of lawyers in Canada for wayward advertising is rare to non-existent
despite some flowering of self-promotional announcements that does
little to promote either professionalism or informed client choice. 130
If I accurately understand the situation of growing lawyer advertising
across this vast land, does this hold promise of radical departure from the
tradition of lawyer self-effacement and public reserve that, to my eye,
typifies the practice of law in Canada? I doubt it. Constitutional amend-
ments and court decisions vigorously enforcing them arise in the context
of the dominant cultural norms of the nation's society-not in defiance
of them. Your Charter is written in a unique way, at least by comparison
with the American Bill of Rights, in that s. 1 expressly admits of
exceptions to it. That provision occurs, of course, neither by accident nor
merely because of any peculiar analytical bent of its drafters. The drafters
knew Canada well enough to know that, while freedoms are important,
the interests of the wider community have competing claims that should
sometimes be given precedence. That is the searing simplicity of s. 1 of
the Charter.
For purposes of predicting the future of lawyer comment to the media
in Canada, my guess, for what it is worth, is that Canada will largely stay
its course. Any civil libertarian in Canada who formerly was interested in
relaxing the rules on media reporting of sensational trials and those
regulating lawyer comments to the media must have been given serious
pause by public and professional reactions in Canada to the O.J. Simpson
media extravaganza in America. While not universal, the reactions that
I have heard from Canadians range from horror and disgust to a somewhat
bemused low expectation. On the policy level, that reaction reportedly
means that efforts in Canada to provide televised trials has become much
more controversial. 13 (Similar reactions of upset were widely heard in the
129. Law Society (Manitoba) v. Savino, [1983] 6 W.W.R. 538 (Man. C.A.). The advertising
rules of Manitoba no longer require pre-filing. See Law Soc. Manitoba, Code of Professional
Conduct (1992) ch. 14, at 54-55.
130. See MacKenzie, supra note 32 at 10-3. See also D. Stager and H. Arthurs, Lawyers in
Canada (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1990) at 191-96.
131. See Blinch, "Canada: Simpson Trial May Deter Cameras in Canadian Courts," Reuter
News Serv. (4 Oct. 1995) (Nexis). As the Simpson case was just beginning, one Canadian
journalist had claimed that, if nothing else, the Simpson trial would make it more likely that
Canada's courts would also be opened to television. Fotheringham, "Canada: Cameras Belong
in Bernardo Courtroom--Canadians Are Pusillanimous About Their Rights" Financial Post
(9 Feb. 1995).
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United States, including among many lawyers.) In Canada, s. 1 of the
Charter is available to the courts as explicit authorization (and require-
ment) to assess in particular cases whether the threat posed to an orderly
and fair trial-one fair to the defendant, to the state as prosecutor, and to
members of the public as interested consumers of justice-is so clear and
direct, and the workability of less restrictive alternatives so problematic
that censoring of either the media or of lawyers involved is required. If so,
Canadian courts are empowered to act, and apparently are willing to do
so to protect Canada's own sense of individual and community justice.
How about the United States-will it turn toward Canada in dealing
with lawyer media comment? Here, I think, there is a greater possibility
of profound legal change. There is a widely shared sense in the United
States-brought on primarily by the O.J. Simpson case and its aftermath,
but by much else that preceded it-that lawyers and the media are
conducting themselves badly, primarily in sensational criminal cases. Of
course, it might be that the media is once again distorting reality-this
time to its own disadvantage. In the mass of run-of-the-mill cases, the
lesser interest of the media in the matter, together with the perhaps greater
threat of disciplinary sanctions, precisely because of the low profile of the
case, may induce a (more normal) lawyer reticence in speaking to the
media. It thus might be that extensive lawyer comment to the media
occurs only rarely, and then only in sensational cases. 32 Ironically, it thus
might be that the media itself, by sensationalizing only certain cases,
constructs the appearance that American lawyers routinely flout the
professional rule.
The O.J. Simpson case, of course, continues. Two months ago, the trial
began in Los Angeles (Santa Monica) in the wrongful-death claims of the
families of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald L. Goldman. This time
different and perhaps more skilled lawyers present the case against
Simpson for the claimants. With civil claims rather than criminal charges,
they do not face some of the procedural disadvantages that confined Mr.
Simpson's original prosecutors. The racial composition of the jury is
different, perhaps significantly so, with a whiter jury possibly harbouring
less suspicion of the police. In California a verdict for the plaintiff in a
civil action is possible even if only nine of the twelve jurors concur. No
longer protected by his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
due to his acquittal in the criminal case, Mr. Simpson can now be
132. See ABA Conference Examines Future, Fees, Commentary, ABA/BNA Lawyers' Man.
on Professional Conduct (1995) 179 at 182 (report of panel discussion at ABA National
Conference on Professional Responsibility, concluding that O.J. Simpson-type trial commen-
tary is unique).
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compelled to testify. Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki is not Judge Lance A. Ito: a
much firmer hand is at the judicial helm. 33
Perhaps most importantly, the media circus that accompanied the
Simpson criminal trial is under greater control this time around. Although
cameras, as the world knows, are allowed in the courtroom in Califor-
nia, 134 they can be banned for specific cases-and Judge Fujisaki has
banned both video and still photographers. Even sketch artists are being
allowed to sketch only from memory; they may not lug their drawing
boards into the courtroom. Perhaps most important of all, the lawyers are
not talking to the media-they cannot. Noting that "[h]istory will repeat
itself unless the court acts to prevent it,"'35 the judge has imposed a gag
order on the lawyers and witnesses. Despite the greater judicial effort at
control, L.A. is L.A. Anti- and pro-Simpson protesters gather daily on the
street outside the courthouse, with signs and t-shirts advertising their
sentiments, and themselves, with some justified assurance that they will
appear on the nightly television news.'36 No doubt the American popular
and legal media, yet to hear the news, will still attempt to sensationalize
the case, and others like it. Large headlines and big pictures-along with
"muckraking, celebrating, predicting the future"137-still typifies too
much of the legal press, much less the popular media. The American
media probably still believes that there is more money to be made
appealing to the worst instincts of Americans rather than to their better
selves. 138
Many lawyers are unhappy with the news blackouts when they occur.
Leo Terrell, described in the press as a civil-rights lawyer and friend of
Mr. Simpson, was recently quoted as saying that the verdict in the
Simpson civil case will resolve nothing-specifically because the court-
room is closed to the media. The difficulty of knowing exactly what is
happening there, according to Terrell, will mean that "[y]ou're going to
133. See e.g. Harper, "Firm hand on Gavel in Simpson Case: This Judge Allows 'No
Shenanigans' Washington Times (19 Sept. 1996) Al; Goldberg, "New, Likely Tauter,
Simpson Trial Opens" N.Y. Times (18 Sept. 1996) A14, col. 4; "Judge Bans Cameras, Video
from Simpson Courtroom" Washington Post (24 Aug. 1996) A24. Among other things, Judge
Fujisaki has ruled that Simpson's lawyers may not waft intimations of other killers into the jury
box unless they offer specific evidence in support. Goldberg, ibid. col. 4.
134. Cal. Rules Ct., rule 980 (1996).
135. Goldberg, supra note 133 at col. 5.
136. T-shirt sales, however, are not as brisk as some entrepreneurs had hoped. See Goldberg,
"Simpson-Case Weariness Mixes with Fascination" N.Y. Times (20 Sept. 1996) A18, col. 1.
137. See L. Caplan, "Why Play-by-Play Coverage Strikes Out for Lawyers" (1996) 82
A.B.A.J. 62 at 63.
138. For example, during the press-induced frenzy that attended the Sheppard murder case,
see supra text at note 49, local newspapers all experienced extraordinary circulation gains. See
supra note 48 at 344, note 93.
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find stories being generated from rumors and hearsay." 13 9 Terrell either
has an unusually low opinion of the print media or a higher opinion of the
educational value of live telecast of trials than some lawyers and most lay
observers were left with after the criminal trial. Even Steven Brill, the
founder and president of Court TV, which became commercially success-
ful in telecasting the Simpson criminal trial, concedes that most viewers
of criminal trials feel like rubber-neckers at a car accident: "You watch
it ... but you don't feel great about yourself after watching it."' 40 My
personal regret is that Judge Fujisaki deserves much more than Judge Ito
to become a household name, but he isn't nearly as likely to make the ten-
best-dressed list (as did Marcia Clark, Simpson's unsuccessful prosecu-
tor 14 1) or otherwise to gain the ill-deserved fame of the characters in the
original drama. 142
But relative media calm does not necessarily equate to a fair trial. It is
widely believed that the enforcement of fair-comment rules against
prosecutors has caused them to "go Deep Throat"14 3-to harken back to
journalism's most famous anonymous source. In the publicity after the
arrest in Montana of Theodore Kaczynski, prosecutors leaked to the
media that the original version of the Unabomber "manifesto" was found
in his cabin, along with the nine-digit secret code he used to identify his
messages to investigators, a typewriter used to write the manifesto, and
a partially completed bomb. 144 The ABA has recently acted against such
prosecutorial excesses, amending the ABA Model Code to add a prohi-
bition against a prosecutor's "making extrajudicial comments that have
a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused.' 45 Effectively dealing with leaks presents vast problems---of
detection, of proof, and of distraction in the ongoing proceeding.
139. Goldberg, supra note 133 at col. 6.
140. Ibid.
141. Marcia Clark, who is widely blamed in other Simpson-trial books of having bumbled the
prosecution, had a kind of last laugh-earning the largest publisher's advance ($4 million) of
all the dozens of Simpson authors. Ibid. at A18, col. 3.
142. It has been reported that over fifty books and audiotapes have so far been produced about
the original Simpson trial. See ibid.
143. I refer, of course, to the still-unknown White House source who provided inside
information heavily damaging to then-President Richard M. Nixon at the time of the Watergate
imbroglio, and which was one of the most significant forces that eventually drove him to resign
as president. See C. Bernstein and R. Woodward, All the President's Men (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1974) at 71-72.
144. See "Prosecutorial Leaks: Are We Compromising Defendants' Rights in the Name of
the First Amendment?" (1996) 82 A.B.A.J. 78 at 79.
145. See ABA Model Rule 3.8(g) (as amended, 10 Aug. 1994).
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In the end, what most profoundly separates the Canadian and Ameri-
can situations on lawyer media publicity is not lawyers, but the media.
The problem of lawyer media publicity is primarily a demand-side
problem; it is created by the media, not by lawyers. If one had subtracted
all of the lawyer media comments in the Sheppard case, for example, the
circus would have proceeded fairly much as it did. The O.J. Simpson
media carnival was caused by the media's fascination with O.J. Simpson,
with his unsuccessful interracial marriage, with issues of spousal abuse,
and generally with the titillation of tragedy afflicting the rich and famous.
O.J. Simpson's lawyers certainly could have been more discreet, but even
their total silence would probably not have otherwise changed dramati-
cally the extent and kind of media coverage that the trial generated. And
that probably typifies most criminal trials that attract media attention. If
the Bernardo case had been tried in the United States, it doubtless would
have been given headline importance in all of American media. Would
even constant comments dropped by an American defence lawyer, or an
American prosecutor, have made the case any more lurid, any more
attention-grabbing, any more "newsworthy"?
To generalize perhaps beyond any permissible bounds for a legal
academic, let me offer a few thoughts on the differences between the
Canadian and American media--differences that strongly influence, if
they do not determine, the place and role of lawyer media comment. The
Canadian media, from my vantage point, seem much more attuned to
official (including judicial) views of an orderly society. The American
media seem far more cynical, distrusting of power, delighted with any
small or large opportunity to suggest official corruption, pettiness,
stupidity. For this purpose, petty falls from grace are accorded almost
equal value as scandal as are major defaults. The Canadian media seem
more interested in events; the American media are preoccupied with
persons. The Canadian media focus more sharply on right or wrong
outcomes and seem more committed to a conception of moral and
immoral behavior;"' the American media is preoccupied with process
and portrays--quite inconsistently and sometimes in the same piece-
either moral hypocrisy or an unwillingness to impose a moral view.
Our increasingly different cultures have given rise to increasingly
different media treatment of sensational events, particularly of sensa-
tional crime. By some unmeasurable degree, our trials-at least our
sensational trials-are also profoundly different. My own sense is that
146. Even after the Bernardo media ban was lifted, not even tabloid publications in Toronto
carried detail of, for example, the videotapes of the young rape victims. Davison, supra note 6.
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Canadian trials are fairer to the accused and to witnesses, but that the
American media is more robust and inquisitive.1 47 Lawyers in our
different cultures have, understandably, had to deal with different media-
and different media consumers. In this and other respects, I strongly
suspect, we will continue on our largely separate ways. I trust and hope
that they will be civilized, decent, and strongly democratic ways, for us
both-for us all.
147. I echo here the reported thought of Canadian-born Harvard Law School Professor Paul
Weiler, who has been quoted in the Canadian press as having said that "The difference between
the United States and Canada... is the difference between a country that makes freedom of
speech a priority and a country that makes due process and fair trial a priority." See Corelli,
"North Versus South" Maclean's (29 May 1995) 18 (report on differences between O.J.
Simpson and Paul Bernardo trials).
